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Post-Decision Diagnosis: Medical Device
Preemption Alive and Mostly Well
After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
Scott W. Sayler
Steven M. Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
As of June 1996, the great majority of courts analyzing the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 had found broad preemp-
tion of state common law tort actions. Then came Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, a case in which the United States Supreme Court
addressed the preemption issue in the context of a specific medi-
cal device that had been exempted from rigorous premarket ap-
proval requirements. In this factually specific context, the Court
concluded that each of plaintiffs' common law tort claims sur-
vived preemption. Lohr, however, does not sound the death
knell for medical device preemption. Careful analysis of the
four separate opinions and the fractured holding suggests a fact-
specific opinion with circumscribed application. In cases involv-
ing medical devices distributed pursuant to premarket approval
requirements and investigational device exemptions, the express
preemption defense arguably should remain viable.
I. THE MDA AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
MEDICAL DEVICES
Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976
("MDA") 1 to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
* Mr. Sayler is a partner in the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Kansas
City, Missouri. He received both his Juris Doctorate and his Bachelor of Science
from the University of Kansas. Mr. Thomas is an associate with the same firm. He
received both his Juris Doctorate and his Bachelor of Science from the University of
Nebraska. Both lawyers practice in the firm's Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Litigation Division.
The views expressed in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily represent
the views of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360c-360k, 379 & 379a (1995), and other scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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("FDCA").2 Some commentators have characterized the MDA
as a statute designed "to protect consumers from dangerous
medical devices."' 3 Legislative history, however, hints that the
MDA had an additional purpose-namely, to encourage re-
search and development of medical devices that "hold the prom-
ise of improving the health and longevity of the American
people."' In furtherance of this purpose, the MDA gave the
United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") jurisdic-
tion over medical devices for the first time.
Under the MDA, medical devices are classified based upon
the degree of risk posed to the consumer. Class I devices do not
pose an unreasonable risk of injury or illness and, accordingly,
are subject to nothing more than "general controls."'5 Examples
of Class I devices include tongue depressors, ice bags, and bed-
pans. Class II devices, while potentially more harmful and dis-
tributed without advance approval, are subject only to federal
performance standards known as "special controls."' 6 Examples
of Class II devices include hearing aids and syringes.
Class III devices are those that (1) present a potentially un-
reasonable risk, or (2) support or sustain human life. Examples
of Class II1 devices include pacemakers and intrauterine de-
vices. A Class III device cannot be marketed unless the manu-
facturer provides the FDA with a "reasonable assurance" that
the device is safe and effective. Specifically, the manufacturer
must obtain "premarket approval" ("PMA").8 The rigorous
process requires manufacturers to provide detailed safety and
efficacy data.
Under certain circumstances, investigational devices can be
distributed without PMA.9 The manufacturer of an investiga-
tional device can file with the FDA an application that, if ap-
proved, allows the manufacturer to distribute the device
2. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-395 (1995)).
3. See, e.g., John D. Burnside, Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.: Falling from the Medi-
cal Device Amendments' Federal Preemption Garden, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 949, 950
(1996).
4. S. REP. No. 94-33, at 1-2 (1976), quoted in Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemp-
tion of Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal Foo, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51
FOOD & DRUG LJ. 509, 548 (1996).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (1995).
6. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
7. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I) & (II).
8. Id. § 360e(a).
9. 21 C.F.R. § 812.1(a) (1996).
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pursuant to an investigational device exemption ("IDE").10 The
overarching purpose of an IDE is to determine, with the help of
closely monitored and pre-approved clinical investigations,
whether a potentially significant medical device is safe and effec-
tive. Intraocular lenses ("IOLs") are an example of a medical
device distributed pursuant to an IDE. Investigational IOLs are
subject to pervasive regulation,1 and courts have recognized
that IOL regulations "broadly govern nearly all facets of the in-
vestigational program.' 2
There are two other exceptions to the PMA requirement.
First, Congress recognized that medical devices already on the
market could not be withdrawn pending PMA analysis by the
FDA. Thus, devices marketed before 1976 are beneficiaries of a
"grandfather" provision; PMA is not necessary. 13 Second, medi-
cal devices that are "substantially equivalent" to devices mar-
keted before 1976 are excepted from the PMA requirement. 4
The latter exemption was intended to (1) prevent makers of
"grandfathered" devices from enjoying a commercial advantage
while competitors were fighting PMA battles, and (2) assure
that improved devices could be marketed without delay.' 5 Mak-
ers of "substantially equivalent" Class III devices must submit a
premarket notification to the FDA. The process of submitting a
premarket notification for purposes of obtaining a "substantial
equivalence" finding under section 510(k) is referred to as the
"section 510(k) process"; medical devices deemed "substantially
equivalent" to pre-1976 devices are oftentimes called "510(k)
devices."
II. MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LoH- THE FACrS
Medtronic utilized the section 510(k) process in bringing to
market its Model 4011 pacemaker lead.' 6 In November 1982,
the FDA concluded that the product was substantially
equivalent to medical devices marketed before the effective date
of the MDA.I7 Accordingly, Medtronic's pacemaker lead-
10. Id. §§ 812.20, 812.30 (1996).
11. See, e.g., i& § 813.20 (1996).
12. Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A) (1995).
14. Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
15. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996).
16. The lead is the portion of a pacemaker that transmits the heartbeat-steadying
electrical signal from the pulse generator to the heart itself.
17. 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
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while subject to the "general control" provisions of the MDA-
was distributed without PMA. In 1987, plaintiff Lora Lohr was
implanted with a Medtronic pacemaker that contained a Model
4011 lead. The pacemaker allegedly failed in 1990, resulting in
emergency surgery. Ms. Lohr's physician attributed the pace-
maker's failure to a defect in the lead.18
Plaintiffs filed a complaint that included negligence and strict
liability counts and challenged the way in which the product had
been designed, manufactured, and labeled. The federal district
court granted Medtronic's motion for summary judgment, which
contended that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by section
360k(a) of the MDA. That statute states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State
or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any re-
quirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any require-
ment applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device
or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to
the device under [the FDCA]. 19
The Eleventh Circuit-after concluding that state common
law actions were "requirements" under section 360k(a)-held
that plaintiffs' failure-to-warn and manufacturing claims were
preempted by FDA labeling regulations and "Good Manufac-
turing Practices" ("GMPs").20 Plaintiffs' design claims, how-
ever, survived preemption.2 ' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts. 22
III. MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LOHR: THE COURT'S UNANIMOUS
DECISION ON Two ISSUES
A. Design Claims
In holding that plaintiffs' design defect claim was not pre-
empted, the Supreme Court reasoned that the section 510(k)
process did not impose a specific, federally enforceable design
requirement. In particular, the section 510(k) process did not
18. Id.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1995).
20. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1350 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'd in part, aff'd
in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
21. Id at 1347-49.
22. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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require Medtronic's product "to take any particular form for
any particular reason."' In the Court's opinion, the section
510(k) process had much to do with "substantial equivalence"
and little to do with safety. The Court characterized the section
510(k) process as a "status quo" mechanism intended to give
manufacturers the freedom to compete with and on the same
terms as makers of pre-1976 medical devices.24
B. Alleged Violations of Federal Requirements
Plaintiffs' claims that Medtronic had violated FDA regula-
tions also survived preemption. The Court explained that noth-
ing in section 360k(a) barred a state from providing a damages
remedy for transgressions of state common law duties that were
parallel to federal requirements. 25 The Court reached this con-
clusion even though manufacturers would face additional ele-
ments under state law. Under the Court's reasoning, the added
elements would make such state requirements narrower-not
broader-than federal counterparts. 26 In such situations, the
state requirements would not be "in addition to" federal re-
quirements. The Court dismissed as overly literal the argument
that additional elements render the state duties "different from"
federal requirements. 27 The Court also determined that a com-
mon law damages remedy for violation of federal requirements
was not an additional or different requirement.28 Rather, it was
just one more reason to comply with federal law.29
23. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2254 (1996).
24. Id. at 2255.
25. Id.
26. ld
27. Id
28. Id
29. In allowing claims based upon the violation of common law duties that mirror
federal requirements, the Court found support in the FDA regulations. It quoted 21
C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2) (1995), which states that section 360k "does not preempt State or
local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements im-
posed by or under the act." Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2256. The Court deferred to the FDA
regulations for two reasons. First, Congress delegated to the FDA the authority to
implement the MDA. That, the Court said, made the FDA "uniquely qualified" to
determine whether congressional objectives would be impeded by a particular form of
state law. Id at 2255. Second, the Court felt that section 360k(a) was ambiguous. Id
at 2255-56. These two factors were said to provide a "sound basis" for giving substan-
tial weight to the FDA's views. Id. at 2255. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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IV. MEDTRONIC, IN. v. LOHR- THE MAJORITY OPINION
A majority of the Court, in the most significant section of the
opinion, held that section 360k(a) and the accompanying regula-
tions supported preemption in those instances "where a particu-
lar state requirement [was] threaten[ing] to interfere with a
specific federal interest. ' 30 In order to be candidates for pre-
emption, state requirements will typically be (1) developed
"'with respect to' medical devices"; (2) specific in terms of ap-
plicability, thereby saving from preemption state requirements
of "general applicability"; (3) "'different from or in addition to'
federal requirements"; and (4) concerned with safety, efficacy,
or any other matter included in a federal requirement that ap-
plies to the device.31 Similarly, in order to have a preemptive
effect, federal requirements will typically (1) apply to the device
in question, and (2) constitute "specific counterpart regulations"
to state law or be specific to a particular device.32 Thus, in
resolving section 360k(a) preemption issues, the Court recom-
mended a "careful comparison between the allegedly preempt-
ing federal requirement and the allegedly preempted state
requirement. '33
At issue in Lohr were federal labeling regulations that re-
quired manufacturers of nearly every medical device to include
in their warning labels "information for use ... and any relevant
hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions."' The
manufacturing requirements were in the form of GMPs. The
Court concluded that these "federal requirements reflect[ed]
important but entirely generic concerns about device regula-
tion. '35 Section 360k(a) and the accompanying regulations, the
Court said, "were designed to protect from contradictory state
requirements only those federal requirements" evidencing a
concern for "a specific device or field of device regulation. '36
As for the state common law requirements at issue, the Court
determined that they were not preempted because they had not
30. 116 S. Ct. at 2257.
31. Md
32. Id. at 2257-58. The Court stopped short of saying that section 360k(a) and
accompanying regulations necessarily precluded (1) general federal requirements
from ever preempting state requirements, or (2) general state requirements from ever
being preempted. Id at 2257.
33. Id. at 2257-58.
34. 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(c) (1996).
35. 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
36. Id
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been developed "'with respect to' medical devices. '37 Accord-
ing to the Court, the legal duties that formed the bases of plain-
tiffs' manufacturing and failure-to-warn 38 claims were "general
obligations" that posed no threat to federal requirements.39
In searching for answers to the legal questions before it, the
Court went beyond section 360k(a). The Court found within
section 360k(a) the intent to preempt some state law, but said it
would look to other areas to identify the scope of the preemp-
tive effect.4° It began by examining the text, but added that such
interpretation could not occur in a "contextual vacuum. '41 The
Court took two principles into account. First, the Court pre-
sumed that Congress would "not cavalierly preempt" state com-
mon law actions. Absent the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress, the presumption against preemption carries the day.42
Second, the Court said that it would look to congressional in-
tent-something that it views as the "ultimate touchstone" in
every preemption case. Specifically, the Court (1) deferred to
section 360k(a) and the surrounding statutory framework, and
(2) attempted to ascertain the way in which Congress expected
the statute and the regulatory regime "to affect business, con-
sumers and the law." 43
V. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Justice Stevens led a four-justice plurality that deemed "un-
persuasive" and "implausible" Medtronic's core argument-
namely, that every state common law action was a requirement
preempted by section 360k(a).44 Ultimately, all nine justices re-
jected Medtronic's argument. The plurality opinion, however,
37. Id.
38. The Court said that "the predicate for the failure-to-warn claim [was] the gen-
eral duty to inform users and purchasers of potentially dangerous items of the risks
involved in their use." Id Actually, in the prescription drug and medical device con-
text, the manufacturer's duty to warn runs not to the patient but rather to the pre-
scribing physician, whom the law recognizes as a "learned intermediary."
39. Id.
40. Id at 2250.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2251.
44. Id. Medtronic presumably advanced this argument for a number of reasons,
not the least of which was its recognition that the company's exposure might be just as
great if plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with one claim instead of 10. Even if liabil-
ity can be established under all claims asserted, a plaintiff can recover damages only
once. In this type of legal setting, the defendant must win every inning to avoid losing
the game.
1997]
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stressed that the statute, if interpreted in such a way, would
leave injured persons with no recourse against medical device
manufacturers.45 The foursome maintained that cloaking manu-
facturers with complete immunity would be improper in the face
of ambiguous statutory language and, in addition, would collide
with congressional efforts to regulate the industry with increased
stringency. 46
The plurality believed that Congress was concerned with spe-
cific state statutes and regulations,47 not general duties embed-
ded in common law tort actions.48 In the plurality's view, the
medical device industry's aversion was to the creation of addi-
tional regulations rather than the preservation of existing com-
mon law duties.49 Focusing on the word "requirement," the
plurality stated that if Congress did intend to preempt all state
common law actions, it had chosen a "singularly odd" word with
which to do it.5 0 They said that the oft-scrutinized word, as used
in section 360k(a), referred to specific duties imposed by states.
In considering how to interpret the word, the plurality's chief
concern was not the way in which the same word had been de-
fined four years earlier, but rather the effect that a given defini-
tion would have. Whereas the effect of defining "requirement"
to include state common law claims in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.51 allowed plaintiff to maintain some theories of re-
covery, the effect of defining "requirement" to include common
law actions in Lohr was a recipe for "wiping out the possibility
of remedy for the Lohrs' alleged injuries."5 2 This is the ultimate
45. Id.
46. Id
47. TWo commentators have recognized that inconsistent results may occur if the
definition of "requirement" is limited to statutes and regulations. See Mark Herr-
mann & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Preemption and Medical Devices: A Response to Adler and
Mann, 51 FoOD & DRuG LJ. 1 (1996). The inconsistency results from the fact that
although many states have codified their product liability law, not all have. If "re-
quirement" is limited to statutes and regulations, claims brought under state product
liability statutes may be subject to preemption. At the same time, preemption might
not apply to claims brought in states with common law product liability standards. Id.
at 8-9.
48. While Justice Stevens dismissed Medtronic's position as "extreme," 116 S. Ct.
at 2253, it should not be forgotten that at the time Medtronic advanced its argument,
nearly every circuit that had considered the issue had concluded that Congress in-
tended for the preemptive scope of the MDA to reach common law claims. See Bum-
side, supra note 3, at 950 n.6.
49. 116 S. Ct. at 2253.
50. Id. at 2251.
51. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Cf. infra section VI.
52. 116 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
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in "results-based" jurisprudence, with the desired results tail
wagging the analysis dog.
In a separate section of the plurality opinion, the same four
justices declined the plaintiffs' invitation to rule that state com-
mon law actions could never constitute "requirements" under
section 360k(a). That, in part, was due to the plurality's belief
that preemption under section 360k(a) would be an uncommon
occurrence.
[G]iven the critical importance of device-specificity in our
... construction of § 360k, it is apparent that few, if any, com-
mon law duties have been pre-empted by this statute. It will
be rare indeed for a court hearing a common law cause of ac-
tion to issue a decree that has "the effect of establishing a sub-
stantive requirement for a specific device."53
VI. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer took the position that the MDA would some-
times preempt state common law actions. He maintained that
the word "requirement" could reasonably be interpreted to in-
clude legal requirements that stem from state tort law.54 Justice
Breyer cited Cipollone, where a Justice Stevens-led plurality
stated:
The phrase "no requirement or prohibition" sweeps broadly
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and
common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass
obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we
noted in another context, "[state] regulation can be as effec-
tively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief ....
Justice Breyer reasoned that if section 360k(a) preempts a
state requirement in the form of "positive" law (for example,
statutes, rules, and regulations), then it should also preempt a
similar requirement in the form of a standard of care imposed
by a state common law action. Distinguishing between different
types of state requirements that exert the same effect, he said,
would yield anomalous results.56
53. Id at 2259 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995)).
54. Id.
55. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
56. Justice Breyer used the following example:
Imagine that, in respect to a particular hearing aid component, a federal
MDA regulation requires a 2-inch wire, but a state agency regulation re-
quires a 1-inch wire. If the federal law, embodied in the "2-inch" MDA reg-
1997]
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Justice Breyer concluded, however, that plaintiffs' particular
claims were not preempted. The federal requirements at issue
in Lohr, he wrote, lacked sufficient specificity. He then injected
into the express preemption mix concepts of "conflict" and
"field" preemption, both of which are subsumed within the doc-
trine of "implied preemption. '57 Justice Breyer viewed such ba-
sic preemption principles as useful given the "different from, or
in addition to" language of section 360k(a).58 In the end, how-
ever, Justice Breyer determined that (1) there was no conflict
between the federal requirements and plaintiffs' common law
theories of liability; and (2) neither Congress nor the FDA in-
tended for the FDA regulations to entirely occupy any relevant
field.5 9
VII. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE/DISSENT
In their partially concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor and three other justices found language within the
text of section 360k(a) that specified (1) an intent to preempt
state common law actions, and (2) the scope of the intended
preemption. 6°
As for the intent to preempt state common law actions, the
dissent-like Justice Breyer's concurrence-resurrected
favorable language from Cipollone and explained that "state
common law damages actions operate to require manufacturers
to comply with common law duties."'6 1 As for the scope of the
intended preemption, the dissent noted that section 360k(a) re-
ulation, pre-empts the state "l-inch" agency regulation, why would it not
similarly pre-empt a state law tort action that premises liability upon the
defendant manufacturer's failure to use a 1-inch wire (say, an award by ajury persuaded by expert testimony that use of a more than 1-inch wire is
negligent)?
116 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
57. The plurality opinion also mentions-but does not discuss-the possibility
that state common law actions could be preempted under the "conflict preemption"
doctrine. Id. at 2259.
58. "Conflict preemption" occurs when the state requirement actually conflicts
with the federal requirement either because compliance with both is impossible or
because the state requirement stands as an obstacle to the full accomplishment of
congressional objectives. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). "Field preemption" occurs when
'[tihe scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it." Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
59. 116 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
60. 1& at 2262.
61. Id.
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fers to "any requirement" different from or in addition to a fed-
eral requirement.62 Given the absence of ambiguity in section
360k(a), the dissent refused to delegate statutory interpretation
chores to the FDA. The dissent criticized the Court for referring
to FDA regulations that narrowed the class of preempting fed-
eral requirements to those deemed "device specific," stating:
"The statute makes no mention of a requirement of specificity,
and there is no sound basis for determining that such a restric-
tion of 'any requirement' exists." 63 Thus, the dissent's view was
that state common law actions were "requirements" that should
be preempted if they impose duties different from or in addition
to FDCA requirements.
The dissent, however, concluded that plaintiffs' design claims
were not preempted because the section 510(k) process imposed
no design requirements.64 Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated
that the claims alleging a violation of federal requirements
should survive preemption because any resulting duties were
not different from or in addition to federal requirements. 65 The
failure-to-warn and defective manufacturing claims, however,
were said to be proper targets of preemption. She explained
that some or all of plaintiffs' defective manufacturing and fail-
ure-to-warn claims would compel Medtronic to comply with re-
quirements that were different from or in addition to
"extensive" federal manufacturing and labeling provisions.66
For the dissent, it was enough that such federal requirements
were "applicable" to Medtronic's pacemaker lead. "Section
360k(a) requires no more specificity than that for pre-emption
of state common law claims. '67
VIII. ANALYSIS: WHERE THE COURT MISSED THE MARK
In the course of addressing medical device preemption in a
specific factual context, the Court issued broad pronouncements
that may be misinterpreted and misused in factually dissimilar
cases. Improper attempts to exaggerate the reach of Lohr and
to apply the holding to cases that do not involve section 510(k)
devices will be and already have been an unfortunate outgrowth
of the opinion. The good news for the medical device industry is
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2263.
64. Id.
65. id.
66. Id. at 2264.
67. Id.
1997]
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that the amount of attention devoted by the Court to the partic-
ulars of the section 510(k) process strongly suggests that the
opinion has limited application. In addition, nothing within the
four corners of Lohr affirmatively states or logically suggests
that the opinion has application beyond the section 510(k)
context.
The Court's broad pronouncements in Lohr stemmed from an
unwillingness (1) to view the text of section 360k(a) as unambig-
uous, (2) to consider the fact that Congress, in the face of years
of express preemption, had declined all invitations to amend
section 360k(a), and (3) to focus on a principal purpose of the
MDA-namely, the use of regulatory uniformity on the federal
level to promote innovation and technology.
After recognizing the preemptive language of section 360k(a),
the Court should have looked to the statute to identify the scope
of the intended preemption. The statute clearly defines the type
of federal requirement capable of having preemptive effect as
"any" requirement "applicable under the [FDCA] to the de-
vice."'68 Section 360k(a) also defines the type of state require-
ment targeted for preemption, namely "any" requirement that is
different from or in addition to any federal requirement and
which relates to the safety or efficacy of the device or to any
other matter included in a federal requirement applicable to the
device under the FDCA.
In identifying the type of federal requirement capable of hav-
ing preemptive effect, the Court strayed unnecessarily from sec-
tion 360k(a) and, instead, reviewed FDA regulations. Only
there did the Court find language supportive of the position that
federal requirements, in order to have preemptive effect, must
be specific counterpart regulations or specific to a particular de-
vice. The dissent correctly noted that section 360k(a) says noth-
ing about "device specificity." Rather, under subsections
360k(a)(1) and (2), the federal requirement must merely be "ap-
plicable" to the device. How subsections (1) and (2) could be
construed as ambiguous so as to invite reference to FDA regula-
tions remains a mystery.
In identifying the type of state requirement capable of being
preempted, the Court looked to FDA regulations and to section
360k(a). Citing 21 C.F.R. 808.1(d)(1), the Court suggested that
state requirements of "general applicability" were not pre-
68. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1995).
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empted.69 In reviewing the preemption statute, the Court found
further support for its position that state requirements survive
preemption unless specific to medical devices. Building upon
limitations set forth in subsections 360k(a)(1) and (2),7° the
Court cited language in section 360k(a) and concluded that a
state requirement would not be preempted unless established
"with respect to" a medical device. Whether the quoted words
mean something beyond applicability is doubtful at best. Just as
the plurality was unwilling to deny injured persons their day in
court on the basis of statutory language viewed as vague,7' the
majority should have refused to subject manufacturers to com-
mon law actions on the basis of language that-if not wholly
innocuous-is certainly ambiguous.
Lohr should have been decided on the basis of section
360k(a) and Cipollone. If the Court truly believed that an ex-
amination of congressional intent was necessary, it should have
undertaken a less abbreviated inquiry. The Court's search fo-
cused on affirmative manifestations of intent, and lost in the in-
quiry was what Congress did not say or do. Despite years of
express preemption in the medical device arena, Congress had
not modified the express preemption language found in section
360k(a). The Court's opinion was equally shortsighted in terms
of its characterization of the MDA. While repeatedly emphasiz-
ing the goal of increased safety and efficacy in the medical de-
vice industry, the Court all but ignored legislative history
indicating that the MDA was also intended to encourage re-
69. Given the unambiguous statutory language, the Court's review of accompany-
ing FDA regulations was unnecessary and improper. But more than that, it was
highly selective. The Court's opinion makes no mention of the FDA regulation that
states that
[section 360k(a)] prescribes a general rule that after May 28, 1976, no State
or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect any
requirement with respect to a medical device intended for human use having
the force and effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, or court decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any re-
quirement applicable to such device under any provision of the act and
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under the act.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1996) (emphasis added). The plurality mentioned this regula-
tion, but determined that the "court decisions" to which it referred were those that
construed state statutes or regulations. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
70. Subsections 360k(a)(1) and (2) indicate that a state requirement will be pre-
empted only if it is different from or in addition to an FDCA requirement and if it is
concerned with the device's safety, efficacy, or any other matter included in an FDCA
requirement.
71. 116 S. Ct. at 2251.
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search and development of medical devices by creating, on the
federal level, a comprehensive and uniform regulatory
environment.
IX. THE IMPACT OF LOHR
A. Counting Heads and Opinions
The collective Lohr opinion is a labyrinth. It includes an
opinion of the Court (authored by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); a plurality
opinion (authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg); a concurring opinion (au-
thored by Justice Breyer); and a partially concurring/partially
dissenting opinion (authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas). When all heads and
opinions are tallied, the numbers add up as follows.
1. Unanimous Opinions Favoring Plaintiffs
All nine justices agreed that, in the section 510(k) context,
design claims and "identity of requirements" claims-in other
words, claims alleging a failure to satisfy state requirements that
parallel federal requirements-survived preemption under sec-
tion 360k(a).
2. Five-to-Four Splits that Favor Defendants
Five justices (Breyer and those who partially concurred and
dissented) did not believe that preemption of state common law
actions under section 360k(a) would be an uncommon occur-
rence. Four justices (Stevens and his plurality) believed that sec-
tion 360k(a) would rarely result in preemption of state common
law actions.
Five justices (Breyer and those who partially concurred and
dissented) relied heavily upon Cipollone and believed that state
common law actions were "requirements." 72 Four justices (Ste-
vens and his plurality) distinguished Cipollone and took the po-
sition that, in section 360k(a), the word "requirement"
encompassed positive law enacted by legislative or administra-
tive bodies. However, these four justices stopped short of say-
72. The obvious significance of this tally is that the Supreme Court has, for the
first time, confirmed that section 360k(a) preempts at least some state common law
actions.
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ing that common law duties could never be "requirements"
within the meaning of section 360k(a).
Five justices (Breyer and those who partially concurred and
dissented) did not take literally the suggestion that a state com-
mon law action must be established "with respect to" a medical
device in order to be susceptible to preemption. Justice
O'Connor and those who joined her partial concurrence/dissent
were clearly in that corner. Justice Breyer embraced the major-
ity's "with respect to" rule, but affirmatively stated that he did
not believe that medical device preemption would be rare. Be-
cause common law actions are seldom developed solely "with
respect to" a particular type of product,, the best inference is
that Justice Breyer would apply the "with respect to" rule less
stringently than would other members of the majority.
3. Five-to-Four Splits that Favor Plaintiffs
Five justices (Stevens and those who joined the majority opin-
ion) believed that federal requirements, in order to have pre-
emptive effect, must be "device specific." Four justices
(O'Connor and those who joined her partial concurrence/dis-
sent) believed that a federal requirement would have preemp-
tive effect if "applicable" to the device in question.
Five justices (Stevens and those who joined the majority opin-
ion) believed that a state requirement, in order to be susceptible
to federal preemption, must have something other than "general
applicability" and be developed "with respect to" a medical de-
vice. Four justices (O'Connor and those who joined her partial
concurrence/dissent) believed that "any" state requirement
would be preempted if different from or in addition to an FDCA
requirement and concerned with safety, efficacy, or any other
matter included in an FDCA requirement.
Five justices (Stevens and those who joined the majority opin-
ion) believed that, in the section 510(k) context, failure-to-warn
claims and defective manufacturing claims survived preemp-
tion.73 Four justices (O'Connor and those who joined her partial
concurrence/dissent) believed that such claims were preempted
by section 360k(a).
73. In the fall of 1996, the FDA published final regulations revising GMPs for
manufacturers of medical devices. See Mary Beth Neraas, Medical Device Preemption
After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 51 FoOD & DRuo LJ. 619, 625 n.47 (1996) (opining
that the preemption door might be "re-open[ed]" due to new GMPs described as "far
more rigorous and specific" than those considered by the Lohr Court).
1997] 199
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Five justices (Stevens and those who joined the majority opin-
ion) believed that, in order to resolve preemption cases under
section 360k(a), there must be an examination of the preemp-
tion statute and the accompanying FDA regulations. Four jus-
tices (O'Connor and those who joined her partial concurrence/
dissent) believed that such cases could be decided on the basis
of section 360k(a) alone.
B. The Future of Medical Device Preemption
Lohr is a narrow opinion that raises more questions than it
answers.74 The Court addressed and ultimately rejected medical
device preemption - but it did so in the factually specific, sec-
tion 510(k) context. At no point did the Lohr Court say
whether or how its opinion should impact the preemption de-
fense in the context of a medical device distributed pursuant to
PMA or an IDE. For manufacturers of medical devices, these
are likely to be the battlegrounds of the future. Victories can be
expected, in large part because the purpose of the section 510(k)
process differs markedly from the objectives of the PMA and
IDE processes. Whereas the section 510(k) process has been
characterized as a "status quo" mechanism that serves as a mar-
ketplace equalizer, the comparatively rigorous, regulation-inten-
sive, and device-specific PMA and IDE processes are safety-
oriented mechanisms that - unless disrupted by state common
law tort claims - can further an important purpose of the MDA
by encouraging research and development of safe medical de-
vices under a uniform system of federal regulation. Thus, unlike
in the section 510(k) context, state common law claims concern-
ing PMA and IDE devices are capable of interfering with or
impeding implementation of specific federal interests.
74. Lars Noah, a University of Florida law professor who specializes in product
liability law, noted:
Breyer's concurrence means this opinion only applies to cases brought
against devices approved under 510(k).... The opinion does not indicate
what would happen with devices approved under the more rigid premarket
approval procedure, so not all medical devices are covered. This was a very
fractured opinion, which in some ways created more of a mess than you had
before.... It leaves you to speculate on how the Court would rule on the
broader questions of federal preemption, and how this opinion related back
to Cipollone.. . . The holding gives the lower courts no clear guidance on
how to resolve common law claims involving preemption issues except for
the 510(k) claims .... In that sense, it's clearly not going to help."
James Cahoy, U.S. Supreme Court: Medical Device Patients Can Sue in State Courts,
WEST'S LEGAL NEws 6272, 1996 WL 354146, June 27, 1996.
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1. Section 510(k) Devices
The Lohr Court concluded that the section 510(k) process was
bereft of "requirements" within the meaning of section
360k(a).7 5 Accordingly, the Court determined that the section
510(k) process lacked preemptive effect.76 Post-Lohr opinions
involving section 510(k) devices have similarly rejected preemp-
tion.77 The viability of the preemption defense in future section
510(k) cases may turn upon the interpretation given to newly
promulgated GMPs--or, for that matter, any other relevant fed-
eral or state requirements-and be limited to those instances in
which the FDA has played a more active role in assessing the
product safety aspects of the section 510(k) device.
2. Medical Devices Distributed Pursuant to Premarket
Approval ("PMA")
A careful reading of Lohr suggests that there is substantial
protection for manufacturers of medical devices that have re-
ceived PMA.78
The Lohr Court devoted tremendous attention to the way in
which Medtronic's pacemaker lead reached the marketplace.
By drawing sharp distinctions between devices deemed "sub-
75. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
76. Design defect claims are the most clearly impacted. All nine justices agreed
that the section 510(k) "substantial equivalency" process failed to impose upon manu-
facturers any design requirements. While only five of the nine justices took the posi-
tion that manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims survive preemption in the section
510(k) context, it is unlikely that the Court will revisit this issue-much less reverse its
position-in the near future.
77. See, e.g., Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
plaintiffs "unreasonably dangerous per se" claim against a metal bone implant manu-
facturer was not preempted); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs' claims against a penile prosthesis manufacturer
were not preempted by section 360k(a)); Dutton v. Acromed Corp., Nos. 69332,
69333, & 69358, 1997 WL 15248 (Ohio App. Jan. 16, 1997) (holding that failure-to-
warn and fraud claims in a case involving bone plates and screws were not pre-
empted); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that plain-
tiff's negligent failure-to-warn claim for a prosthetic hip replacement was not
preempted); Shea v. Oscor Med. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. I1. 1996) (holding
plaintiff's strict liability claims for alleged design defect involving sensing and pacing
lead were not preempted).
78. Prior to Lohr, several circuit courts had determined that the PMA require-
ments had preemptive effect because they were specific to particular devices. See,
e.g., Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir.), cer denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995);
Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2614 (1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
824 (1993); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 510
U.S. 824 (1993).
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stantially equivalent" under the section 510(k) process and de-
vices marketed pursuant to the PMA process, the Court did
everything but affirmatively state that its holding was limited to
section 510(k) devices. Section 510(k) products-subject to
nothing more than "general control" provisions-are reviewed
for "substantial equivalence" rather than safety.79 At the con-
clusion of the section 510(k) process, manufacturers are admon-
ished by the FDA that "substantial equivalence" determinations
are not akin to product safety endorsements.8° Recognizing that
the average "substantial equivalence" assessment is a twenty-
hour undertaking, the Court concluded that the section 510(k)
process was "by no means" comparable to the PMA process.8'
In stark contrast to the section 510(k) process,82 the PMA
process is "extensive. '8 3 The Lohr Court referred to the PMA
process as "rigorous" on more than one occasion.84 The adjec-
tives are accurate. In the PMA setting, manufacturers must pro-
vide detailed safety and efficacy data to FDA officials. On
average, the FDA needs approximately 1200 hours to review a
PMA submission.85 During the PMA process, the FDA reviews
reams of information about a particular device-all in an effort
to determine whether that particular device is safe and effective.
The FDA implements requirements applicable to PMA devices
by sending specific approval letters to manufacturers. Device
specificity is an inherent aspect of the PMA process. As one
commentator noted:
79. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
80. Id. at 2248.
81. Id.; see also Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort
Awards by the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FoOD & DRuo LJ. 509, 550
(1996) ("The simplest route to market is through the provisions found in subsection
510(k) of the MDA.").
82. The FDA's section 510(k) process was made more demanding through the
passage of the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511
(1990) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Section 510(k) de-
vices now receive more active review and are cleared through an FDA order. See 21
U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A) (1995). In addition to providing information comparing the
proposed device with devices marketed prior to 1976, manufacturers must provide
any available data concerning safety or efficacy. See Neraas, supra note 73, at 625
n.46 (concluding, however, that courts are unlikely to deem the new section 510(k)
procedures preemptive of state common law claims); see also Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2248
n.4 ("In 1990, Congress enacted amendments to the MDA which were designed to
reduce the FDA's reliance on the section 510(k) process while continuing to ensure
that particularly risky devices received full PMA review.").
83. See Burnside, supra note 3, at 951.
84. See, e.g., 116 S. Ct. at 2246, 2248.
85. Id. at 2246-47.
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PMA approval is a specific determination by the FDA re-
garding a particular device. The FDA reviews detailed design,
labeling, and manufacturing data specific to the device, grant-
ing approval only when there is "reasonable assurance" that
the device is both safe and effective. The FDA's approval
must be based on "valid scientific evidence," which includes
animal studies and human clinical investigations where appro-
priate.... Thus when the FDA finally gives PMA approval, it
has found that the specific design, manufacturing, and labeling
of a particular device are reasonably safe and effective. The
PMA supplemental regulations underscore the specificity of
this finding, requiring FDA approval for any changes in those
features of the device that affect safety or effectiveness. PMA
approval, therefore, is an authorization under federal law to
distribute a particular device manufactured under a specific
process with a specific approved design and labeling.'
Because of the "device specific" nature of the PMA process,
the pivotal issue in post-Lohr PMA cases is likely to be whether
the state common law action has specific applicability and was
established "with respect to" medical devices. In tackling this
issue, manufacturers must focus on language that helps explain
the apparent need to demonstrate specificity on the part of the
state common law action. There are two helpful passages in
Lohr. First, the Court stated that preemption should occur
"only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere
with a specific federal interest." More importantly, the Court
wrote that state common law requirements that are not devel-
oped "with respect to" medical devices are "not the kinds of
requirements that Congress and the FDA feared would impede
the ability of federal regulators to implement and enforce spe-
cific federal requirements. '"m The necessary corollary is that a
common law requirement is developed "with respect to" medi-
cal devices if, in fact, it would impede implementation and en-
forcement of specific federal requirements. The first passage
similarly focuses upon the threat that the common law require-
ment poses to the specific federal requirement. Again, the com-
prehensive nature of the PMA process should enable
manufacturers to demonstrate that state common law actions
are capable of interfering with and impeding the implementa-
86. Daniel G. Jarcho, Premarket Approval and Federal Preemption of Product Li-
ability Claims in the Wake of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 51 FoOD & DRUG LJ. 613, 617
(1996).
87. 116 S. Ct. at 2240, 2257.
88. It at 2258.
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tion of specific federal interests and requirements. The courts,
however, have reached differing results in post-Lohr PMA
cases. 9
3. Devices Distributed Pursuant to an Investigational Device
Exemption ("IDE")
Lohr should also bode well for manufacturers of medical de-
vices distributed pursuant to an IDE. An IDE is intended "to
encourage, to the extent consistent with the protection of the
public health and safety and with ethical standards, the discov-
ery and development of useful devices intended for human use
.... 90 A detailed regulatory regime specifies how an IDE
"may be applied for, how the application is reviewed and ap-
proved by the FDA, and how clinical investigations.., are to be
monitored." 91 Manufacturers seeking an IDE for a particular
medical device must (1) submit to the FDA an application con-
taining an investigational plan, (2) maintain records of the inves-
tigation, and (3) report investigations to the FDA.92
Manufacturers applying for an IDE must justify the commence-
ment of testing in humans and assure that the rights and safety
of humans are adequately protected. Investigations must be re-
89. Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. App. 1996)
(holding plaintiff's negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty claims against a
surgical aid fluid manufacturer were not preempted); Kernats v. Smith Indus. Med.
Sys., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 1300 (Ill. App. 1996) (holding that design defect, manufacture,
and warranty claims against a catheter manufacturer were not preempted); Walker v.
Johnson & Johnson Vision Prod., Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. App. 1996) (holding
plaintiff's claims against a disposable contact lens manufacturer were not preempted);
Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110, 117 (Pa. 1996) (in a case involving Zyderm Collagen
Implant, the court held (a) that plaintiff's strict liability claim was preempted by sec-
tion 360k(a), (b) that negligence claims involving product labeling and product devel-
opment were preempted because the FDA had "preempted the field of regulation,"
and (c) that several other negligence claims were not preempted because they would
have imposed duties that mirrored federal requirements); Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1997) (in case involving extended-wear contact lenses, the court
found no preemption with respect to claims based upon negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict liability).
90. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (1995); see also Stephen D. Harris, Preemption of State
Tort Claims Under the Medical Device Amendments, 24 CoLo. LAW. 2217,2217 (1995)
("The IDE process is designed to encourage innovation and experimentation in the
development of medical devices.").
91. See Carrier, supra note 81, at 550.
92. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(2)(B); see also 21 C.F.R. § 812.20(b)(3) (1996) (manu-
facturer must provide a "description of the methods, facilities, and controls used for
the manufacture, processing, packing, storage, and, where appropriate, installation of
the device, in sufficient detail so that a person generally familiar with good manufac-
turing practices can make a knowledgeable judgment about the quality control used
in the manufacture of the device").
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viewed by a qualified Institutional Review Board established
pursuant to FDA regulations. 93 Investigators94 must agree that
the patient will provide an informed consent and execute an
FDA-approved informed consent form.95
Investigational devices, which can be distributed without
PMA, are excepted from most safety, efficacy, and performance
standards.96 However, pervasive and device-specific regulations
nevertheless apply. In a pre-Lohr opinion, the Seventh Circuit
accurately explained that during the investigational stages, the
FDA cannot "be expected to specify the safe and effective de-
sign of a device." 97 If there were a design known to be safe and
effective, the medical device would cease to be experimental.
The circuit court noted that the entire aim of such an investiga-
tion is to determine whether the medical device is safe and effec-
tive.98 FDA regulations that concern medical devices
distributed pursuant to an IDE "do not specify the safe and ef-
fective design; they specify the procedures for determining
whether the experimental design is safe and effective. These are
requirements relating to safety and effectiveness and they can
therefore have preemptive effect." 99 Even in the wake of Lohr,
the specificity of the IDE procedures should empower them
with preemptive effect.
The other hurdle constructed by Lohr involves the need to
demonstrate specificity with regard to the state requirement. In
determining whether the state common law action was devel-
oped "with respect to" medical devices, the focus should rest on
whether the state common law action interferes with or impedes
implementation of specific federal interests. In the IDE context,
there clearly is a specific federal interest in creating a protective
environment in which the safety and efficacy of certain medical
devices can be thoroughly investigated. Allowing liability to at-
tach through state common law actions would interfere with that
93. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(3)(A)(i).
94. An investigator is the physician "who actually conducts an investigational
study" (in other words, the person "under whose immediate direction an investiga-
tional device is" implanted). 21 C.F.R. § 813.3(e).
95. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(3).
96. 21 C.F.R. § 812.1(a).
97. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir.), cerL denied,
506 U.S. 917 (1992).
98. id.
99. id.
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important federal objective. 1°° While the courts have reached
differing results in post-Lohr IDE cases,101 one Sixth Circuit
opinion is particularly helpful for manufacturers of IDE
devices.Yo2
4. Preemption in the Event of Actual Conflict
The majority opinion indicates that one of the ways in which
preemption will occur is through the existence of an actual con-
flict between a device-specific federal requirement and a state
requirement that has specific applicability. Preemption should
undoubtedly lie in those instances in which the state and federal
requirements actually conflict. However, it does not necessarily
100. One commentator makes a strong argument in support of the position that,
in post-Lohr IDE cases, preemption under section 360k(a) will be particularly appro-
priate with respect to design defect claims. Neraas, supra note 73, at 628. ("If plain-
tiffs are permitted to bring tort suits claiming defective design of experimental
devices, in effect they would be imposing design requirements on devices that are
affirmatively exempt under federal... requirements 'different from.... or in addition
to,' the federal standard, which in this case is the lack of a requirement.").
101. See, e.g, Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., 92 F.3d 1181 (4th Cir. 1996)(holding that a claim alleging noncompliance with federal regulations against an in-
traocular lens manufacturer was not preempted; the court did not address claims
based upon strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty); Shea v. Oscor Med.
Corp., 950 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that plaintiff's claims against a car-
diac defibrillator manufacturer were not preempted because the state law claims
would have imposed duties equal or substantially identical to federal requirements);
Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 181 (N.D.N.Y 1996) (holding that plaintiff's
claims against the manufacturer of a prosthetic hip replacement system were pre-
empted because the IDE regulations were specific counterparts to state requirements
that would be imposed by tort liability); Connelly v. Iolab Corp., 927 S.W.2d 848 (Mo.
1996) (en banc) (holding plaintiff's tort claims against an intraocular lens manufac-
turer were not preempted because the IDE regulations did not conflict with the state
requirements that plaintiff's lawsuit would have imposed); Chambers v. Osteonics
Corp., 109 F.3d 1243 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiff's strict liability and implied
warranty claims for an artificial hip were preempted, but plaintiffs claim based upon
failure to comply with FDA requirements could proceed).
102. In Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997), peti-
tion for cert. filed, No. 96-1749 (May 1, 1997), the court found plaintiffs tort claims
preempted in a case involving an allegedly defective pacemaker. In determining
whether the federal requirements at issue were "device specific" and therefore capa-
ble of preemptive effect, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the absence of regulations
governing pacemakers like the one at issue. However, the court concluded that the
federal requirements nevertheless had preemptive effect due to the "device specific"
nature of the IDE application and approval process. Id. at 1097. As for the state
requirements, the court acknowledged that it was "questionable" whether they were
"with respect to" a medical device and not merely of "general applicability." The
court stated: "[T]he state requirement appears not specifically applicable solely to
medical devices. However, the state statute is the kind of requirement that would
impede the implementation and enforcement of specific federal requirements." Id at
1099.
22
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 10
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol6/iss1/10
Preemption After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
follow that preemption only occurs in the event of an actual con-
flict between the state and federal requirement. While plaintiffs
advanced such a position in Lohr, the Court stopped short of
articulating an "actual conflict" requirement. In fact, the only
hint that "actual conflict" may be a preemption prerequisite is
the dissent's interpretation of the majority opinion.10 3 However,
given the possible ambiguity, the medical device industry should
be on the lookout for attempts by plaintiffs to characterize fed-
eral requirements as minimum standards that are not in actual
conflict with different or additional duties imposed by state com-
mon law actions.
Consider, for instance, a device-specific federal provision that
requires a pacemaker warning label to contain information
about A. Further assume that plaintiff asserts a failure-to-warn
claim, contending that the pacemaker warning label should have
contained information about A and B. Plaintiff might argue that
there is no actual conflict in a strict sense. In other words, it
may be possible for the manufacturer to (1) comply with the
federal requirement by warning about A, and (2) comply with
the state requirement by warning about A and B. In such a situ-
ation, requiring an "actual conflict" in a strict sense strays much
too far from the text of section 360k(a). The plain language of
the statute indicates that the state requirement is preempted if
different from or in addition to the federal requirement. With-
out question, a common law duty to warn about A and B would
be different from and in addition to a federal provision that re-
quires the manufacturer to warn about A.
C. Different Approaches in the Wake of Lohr
Lohr's bark is worse than its bite. While the opinion's holding
is adverse to defendants, its reach is suspect. The amount of at-
tention devoted to the lenient nature of the section 510(k) pro-
cess suggests that the holding warrants narrow application.
Thus, the medical device industry must be wary of adversaries'
attempts to exaggerate the impact of the opinion. Unfortu-
nately, efforts to confine the holding to the section 510(k) con-
text may not always be successful. Accordingly, the industry
must develop litigation strategies designed to combat the possi-
bility of increased exposure.
103. Id. at 2263.
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Because federal requirements are less likely to dictate prod-
uct design than manufacturing processes or product labeling, de-
sign defect claims may be the most likely to survive preemption.
Thus, manufacturers should consider fighting design defect
claims with weaponry other than section 360k(a). The Ameri-
can Law Institute is in the process of completing its work on the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. The section of
the proposed restatement devoted to prescription drugs and
medical devices provides that design defect liability will attach
only in those instances where the medical device's foreseeable
risks of harm outweigh the therapeutic benefits to such an ex-
tent that no reasonable health care provider would prescribe the
device for any class of patients. A comment to the proposed
section explains that "[g]iven this very demanding standard, lia-
bility is likely to be imposed only under unusual
circumstances."'104
CONCLUSION
The most that can be said of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr is that it
definitively answered one question-whether the MDA, given
the federal and state requirements applicable at the time of the
decision, preempted the state common law actions asserted by
the plaintiffs in a case that involved a medical device that had
been distributed pursuant to the section 510(k) process. The
Court did not say how its holding should be applied, if at all, in
cases involving PMA and IDE devices. While not all "pre-
cincts" are reporting, early returns hint of confusion and incon-
sistency in the lower courts. It remains possible and appropriate
that the Supreme Court will settle the issue by agreeing to re-
view a PMA or IDE case. In the meantime, medical device
manufacturers can and should view Lohr as an open door. The
purpose and specific nature of PMA and IDE provisions-cou-
pled with the fact that common law requirements pertaining to
such devices are capable of disrupting these important federal
interests-indicate that the preemption defense remains viable
beyond the section 510(k) context.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 8 cmt. f (Pro-
posed Final Draft Oct. 18, 1996).
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